The jewish experience in the contemporary scene. The transformations of the Nation-State and the development of new Inter-Civilizational relations by Eisenstadt, S.N.
 Revue européenne des sciences sociales
European Journal of Social Sciences 
XLIV-135 | 2006
Citoyenneté et démocratie providentielle
The jewish experience in the contemporary scene.
The transformations of the Nation-State and the
development of new Inter-Civilizational relations
S.N. Eisenstadt
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ress/268
DOI: 10.4000/ress.268
ISSN: 1663-4446
Publisher
Librairie Droz
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 August 2006
Number of pages: 157-169
ISBN: 9-782-600-01108-2
ISSN: 0048-8046
 
Electronic reference
S.N. Eisenstadt, « The jewish experience in the contemporary scene. The transformations of the
Nation-State and the development of new Inter-Civilizational relations », Revue européenne des
sciences sociales [Online], XLIV-135 | 2006, Online since 13 October 2009, connection on 01 May 2019.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ress/268  ; DOI : 10.4000/ress.268 
© Librairie Droz
IThe Jewish experience on the contemporary scene evinces some very impor-
tant new characteristics which take it not only beyond the « traditional», historical
Jewish experience as well as beyond such experience as it crystallized in the clas-
sical period of the modern nation state. The most important of these new charac-
teristics are: the nature of heterogeneity of Jewish communities in its relation to
the basic ideological and institutional frameworks of the major civilizations in
which Jews live; and the transformation of the «classical» model of European
modern nation state. These new developments are rooted in internal changes in
developments in the Jewish communities ; in the emergence of new types of insti-
tutional settings in which these communities live; and in the transformation of the
broader ideological and institutional civilizational and inter-relations.
II
Heterogeneity in Jewish history is as old as the Exile – and even before that.
Jewish communities in the Christian and the Muslim worlds have known different
physical settings, economic activities and varieties of «protected » political status
for the past 1,500 years. Local customs and cultures varied widely, but there was
always the common bond of the different Jewish traditions. With minor excep-
tions, they shared the same basic premises about the nature of this tradition and of
their collective identity. This began with a very strong emphasis on Halakhah (the
Law), as the basis of Jewish collective existence. The Halakhah, with its prayer,
ritual and study, and its purely legal aspects provided the institutional framework
for Jewish cultural continuity, and the framework for all elements of Jewish col-
lective identity. The most important of these elements was based upon a strong
historical consciousness; an equally strong sense of primordial kinship – symbol-
ically expressed in the descent from Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; a religious-
cultural identity; and lastly, at that time only latently, political identity. There nat-
urally developed among these communities a certain variety of cultural content
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and activity. Thus, for instance, in some communities there was a greater empha-
sis on the study of philosophy; in others, the Kabbalah was more central. There
were also, of course, varying degrees in the influence of the local cultures, but the
basic elements were common to most Jewish communities. But this heterogeneity
was, on the whole, set within a common framework. This constellation of identity
and tradition contained a certain response to the basic dilemmas of Jewish exis-
tence and self-conception. One such dilemma, that of the universal vs. the partic-
ularist elements in Jewish culture, was solved by the postponement of the univer-
salist elements through open dialogue and encounter with other nations. Jewish
existence remained particularist, albeit in the name of a universalist orientation
which could not be realized in the pre-medieval and medieval exile in which the
Jews were living. The universal orientation was possible only in a latent sense, as
a focus for theological disputes, or as a dream. This was connected, of course,
with the solution to another dilemma, that of present reality vs eschatological
hopes. Again, the eschatological orientations, whether universalist or particular-
ist, were deferred to some unknown future. This was closely related to the fact that
temporal Jewish reality was even to some extent apolitical, while the eschatolog-
ical element in Judaism always had a strong political element.
III
The contemporary picture is different. The dispersion of the Jews is probably
greater than ever before. Immigration to the new continents widened the geo-
graphical spread, and the resettlement in the Land of Israel was another important
factor. However, greater physical or economic diversity are not the only new
developments on the contemporary situation. Most important is the development
of a new type of pluralism and heterogeneity in the socio-cultural life of Jewish
communities – both in their cultural contents and in the components in the Jewish
identity which are continuously being reconstructed by the Jewish communi-
ties.Throughout the various Jewish communities, there is great variety in the cus-
toms and organization of Jewish life and the identification with world Jewry. In
the Western world, there are many different Jewish religious groups: Orthodox,
Reform, Conservative in the United States; Orthodox, Reform and Liberal in
Europe. In addition, many Jews are not affiliated with any of these religious
frameworks; others are active in Jewish cultural and communal activities, and
others are entirely passive in relation to their Jewishness. In Israel, too, there has
developed a great heterogeneity in the symbols or patterns of Jewish identity and
communal organizations. This heterogeneity is manifest in the numerous ways of
articulating patterns of Jewish life and identity. First, a situation developed in
which the simple correlation assumed as natural, especially in the nineteenth cen-
tury in Western Europe, between shedding traditional ways of life and giving up
elements of Jewish identity, no longer held. Many Jews were continuously chang-
ing their ways of life, and most of them in the Diaspora did not lead lives primar-
ily or fully Jewish, but they might not want to lose their Jewish identity. They
attempted to reformulate this identity, even if it was no longer the only exclusive
and perhaps not even the predominant one, and to find social space for what
seemed to them distinctly Jewish activities.
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Second, and closely related to this, has been the continuous restructuring of
the components and symbols of this identity. Here two processes were continu-
ously taking place. The first process was that, in addition to shedding certain of
these components and symbols, continuous attempts were made to reconstruct
and recombine them in different ways. The second process entailed, in most cases,
both the reformulation and recombination of most of the attachments to a religious
tradition, together with more primordial ones, with some elements of « people-
hood», and a reemphasis on the political component in this tradition; that is, those
components seen earlier, through the nineteenth century, as antithetical to the
incorporation of Jews in the modern societies. Of special importance in this con-
text was the crystalization in its fullest way after the Second World War, of a new
or at least hitherto dominant element in this collective experience, of the full crys-
tallization of legitimate collective Jewish political activity within the political
framework of the respective societies. The pinnacle of this development is, of
course, to the establishment of the state of Israel and the continuous and continu-
ously reconstitutional relations between it and all the Jewish communities of the
Diaspora.
This process of reformulation and reconstitution of different components of
Jewish identity naturally, in most Jewish communities, was very closely related to
a parallel process in the selection of different elements of Jewish tradition. Here,
too, was continuous search and exploration, about which we know systematically
relatively little. The most interesting aspect of this process is that, contrary to the
previous conception, no simple relation could be found between attachment to dif-
ferent Jewish customs and traditions, commitment to Jewish identity, and partici-
pation in the more general arenas of life in their host societies. Even within the
orthodox circles, seemingly the ones in which the older components should
always go together, the picture is very complex. Thus even the upsurge of ortho-
doxy and neo-orthodoxy was connected to a growing participation in the arenas of
life of the general society, such as higher education and other occupational
spheres, which would have been an anathema or at least alien to the older, Eastern
European traditionalists. It also was connected to a growing participation in some
political Jewish activities of the new kind. The picture is even more complex
among the non-orthodox. Among them there often developed a tendency to return
to certain traditions or customs that had religious origins, and which have become
symbols of collective identity, such as candle lighting on Hannuka and the Sab-
bath, or celebration of those aspects of the tradition related to the most primordial
facts of life : circumcision (which is obviously the choice of the parents), bar mitz-
vah, marriage, funerals. These different patterns of reconstruction of religious
symbols were not necessarily related to a return to orthodoxy, to the acceptance of
the Halakhah as the basic framework of Jewish life, although such a process was
taking place to some extent among sectors of Jewish communities. Therefore, no
simple relation between such «contents» and the nature of Jewish identity and
commitment developed among various Jewish communities.
Yet another new element, connected with Jewish civilizational activities or
aspirations, became predominant. In many cases, Jews who were searching for the
expression of their Jewish identity tended to combine this search with those,
above all universalist themes that, as it were, were « repressed» in the Medieval
patterns and that, in the early assimilationist period, were taken beyond the scope
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of Jewish communal activity and which were not connected with such activities.
In some cases the older semi-assimilationist, « ethical» (liberal, socialist, or
nationalist) attitudes persisted. In most cases, however, these attitudes more and
more were connected with the development of a more positive Jewish collective
identity and commitment. In many cases the emphasis on these themes became
closely related to activities in Jewish communal activities, institutions and orga-
nizations. These themes were seen as constructive, positive components of the
general setting of contemporary societies, and often they were promulgated in
connection with the state of Israel.
Moreover, these activities take place not only in the private spaces of the Jews,
but also in the more central public and political arenas. Such activities are con-
ducted mostly in the languages of their respective countries of residence (English,
French, Spanish, and the like) and in the terms of the intellectual discourse of
these societies. At the same time, however, they often are presented both as
expressing the different dimensions of Jewish identity and as a legitimate part of
the general society.
Different Jewish communities or sectors differ today as to how they go about
this task. There are different emphases on various components of collective Jew-
ish identity, of the Jewish cultural repertoire, and nowhere is there a full distinc-
tive crystallization of some new combination of the elements. Rather in every
Jewish community or sector there continuously develop processes of experimen-
tation with the different elements of Jewish identity; no community has settled for
a « solution » or end point ; and all communities are in a constant state of flux. One
very central and crucial aspect of this flux of course is the continuous drifting
away of large sectors of the Jewish communities from any Jewish organizational
framework and attachment to any Jewish traditions or symbols. The connecting
elements, however, are the very acts of experimentation, the continuous search,
and the mutual awareness within these different Jewish communities that they
share common heritage and this common search, the details of which are greatly
influenced in each community by the specific circumstances in which their mem-
bers live.
The great heterogeneity in the selection of different components of Jewish
identity and tradition has been closely connected with the different modes of the
different Jewish communities’ modern historical experience, especially of their
encounter with the modernities of their host civilization. This growing hetero-
geneity of Jewish ways of life, perhaps in a somewhat paradoxical way, seems to
fit well with what often is designated as trends to a postmodern society. In this
society many of the clear boundaries of collectivities, national and ethnic entities
of social classes and sectors, and their relatively homogeneous styles of life that
characterized early modernity seemed to have been somewhat blurred, giving rise
to a more variegated pluralism. At the same time, the very blurring of many of
these boundaries poses new challenges before the Jews.
Thus while there is no simple answer to the question «Who is a Jew?» and
«What does it mean to be a Jew», it is the questioning itself which unites the Jew-
ish world today, even including the Orthodox communities. These developments
were closely connected with the development of specific Jewish organizations,
with new ventures in Jewish education and communal activities and a growing
political activity of such international Jewish organizations as the World Jewish
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Congress. Second, participation in general arenas of American (and to a smaller
extent European) life was continuously growing, with many Jews moving into
various occupations and economic sectors that hitherto on the whole had been
closed to them, to become more and more active in political life, on the local,
state, and national level.
IV
These far-reaching transformations in the organization and activities of the
Jewish people in the various communities of the Diaspora, especially in the
United States and in the beginning, at least to a smaller degree, in Western Europe,
were connected with parallel change in the formulation by large sectors of Jewish
communities of the problematic of Jewish collective existence. This change went
beyond the premises of the European nineteenth- and twentieth-century experi-
ence in general and classical Zionist ideology in particular, the very ideology that
shaped the revolutionary and ideological premises of Israel and guided and
shaped much of the Israeli perception of and attitude to the Diaspora. This prob-
lematic was formulated, even if intermittently and not always in a fully articulated
way, not in terms of the dilemma between assimilation and the maintenance of a
collective Jewish life in a purely Jewish environment, whether the closed one of
orthodoxy, or in principle the open ones of the Zionist variety, or as one minority
nation in a state composed of many such nations, with one nation being the major-
ity. Instead, among most contemporary Jewish communities in the Diaspora, espe-
cially of course only among those who cared about this at all, a continuous search
developed to find different ways of expressing Jewish collective identity and Jew-
ish peoplehood, stressing the political and the civilizational dimensions of this
identity, while being full and equal members of their respective national or politi-
cal collectivities. This problematic developed in different modes in different Jew-
ish communities, according to their different historical experience, but the basic
assumption that Jews, in different modern or « postmodern» societies, can search
for different ways of expressing their collective identity and for incorporation into
these societies seemed to be common to most of them. Basically, despite many
misgivings and fears about the ultimate lack of viability of Jewish life in the Dias-
pora and even though existence in the Diaspora continued to constitute a problem
in Jewish collective consciousness, the formulation of such problematic, within
most sectors of Jewish society in the Diaspora, took the possibility of such free
collective existence m ore or less for granted, and concentrated on finding differ-
ent ways of expressing Jewish identity. Despite all contrary trends, those among
the Jews concerned with such matters seemingly were able to find in the new set-
ting and the countries in which they lived not only possibilities of maintaining
Jewish collective identity and activities based on primordial, political, and civi-
lizational orientations but also combining such activities with full participation in
their societies. It indeed does seem that the majority of American, and more and
more also among European, Jews, and especially those who actively upheld their
Jewishness, refused to see any basic contradiction between their American (or
English, French, and so on) identity and their Jewishness and refused to see in
anti-Semitism (some even tried to deny its very existence) a basic threat to their
incorporation as Jews in that society.
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Yet, at the same time, among many of the Jewish leaders and intellectuals a
growing concern developed about the possible assimilation on drifting away of
Jews through ecological dispersion and intermarriage and a concomitantly there
developed growing interest in strengthening Jewish educational institutions as a
way to strengthen their attachment to the Jewish inheritance. But this concern is
firmly set within the framework of the Jewish existence in the Diaspora, even if
many of their activities and attachments to a very high degree are oriented also to
Israel. For others, perhaps ultimately a majority, this concern may go together
with a de facto acceptance of growing assimilation or rather drifting away from
the Jewish fold.
Thus, a rather paradoxical situation indeed has developed, most clearly
observed with respect to the Jews in the United States; namely, those very
processes that enabled the intensification of Jewish activities and organizations
also could move for a relatively fast and smooth assimilation or drifting away.
This could happen just because such assimilation could take place without
demands for changing religion or even denying one’s Jewishness. Such drifting
away also may be reinforced by the fact that the various Jewish communities were
traveling on different historical roads, they did not necessarily have the same
types of historical experience. All these processes, on the one hand, open up the
possibility of growing creativity in the construction of different modes of Jewish
experience. On the other hand, they enhance the possibility of large sectors of
Jewish population drifting away from the Jewish fold. At the same time, these
developments also could enhance the possibility of exposure of many sectors of
Jewish society to a seemingly unexpected outburst of primordial components of
the identity in many sectors of their host societies. Above all, the challenges have
sharpened the problem of whether it would be possible in the contemporary period
to crystallize some new patterns not only of Jewish communal life and activities
but also of Jewish civilization. This problem has become very acute given the
great heterogeneity in patterns of Jewish life, the growing dissociation between
different components of Jewish collective life : customs, different forms of Jewish
communal organization, components of Jewish identity, and the promulgation of
different themes of Jewish civilization, the changing patterns of the Western civi-
lizations, and the multiple modes of interaction of Jewish communities with the
societies in which they live. All these developments have crystallized fully only
since the mid-1960s. The major Jewish Communities – in Israel, North America
and Western Europe, and nowadays in Eastern Europe– began at this time to
reconstruct, on the basis of the above-mentioned developments, their internal
activities and self-conceptions, their interrelations, as well as their relations to the
societies within which they live.
V
Several processes are of crucial importance in explaining the differences
between the classical, modern and contemporary patterns of Jewish life and the
contemporary Jewish scene. First, the tragedy of the Holocaust dashed the hopes
of Jews who dreamed of participating in the larger society on an individual basis,
or mainly as a religious denomination, without reference to broader collective
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Jewish identity. The second development, which began in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, but flowered more recently, was the construction of the great cen-
tre of Jewish life in the U.S. In this connection one must remember one factor
which has not been fully appreciated in the analysis of American Jewish history –
that the American nation is based upon a political ideology, rather than historical
primordial symbols, that its major consensus is based, to use R. Bellah’s expres-
sion, on «civil religion ». Because of this it was potentially more open to collec-
tive political expressions of ethnic and religious subgroups than were 19th and
early 20th century European nation-states. I say «potentially», because these pos-
sibilities are also fraught with latent tensions and hostility. The third development
is the weakening of the old closed homogeneous society of the European nation-
state, which did not allow for legitimate secondary collectivities based on a com-
bination of primordial, political and religious identities.
The weakening on the contemporary scene of the classic European nation-
state with its strong emphasis on the historical and primordial components of col-
lective consciousness and identity necessarily added new dimensions to the hete -
rogeneity of contemporary Jewish life. This weakening also posed new challenges
for the reconstruction of Jewish life. It opened up the possibility both of new
modes of reaffirmation of Jewish collective consciousness and cultural and social
activities and the continuous weakening of such consciousness in the constitution
of the collective consciousness of many Western societies, both in the United
States and lately also in Europe,
It is a moot question to what extent all these tendencies make invalid the basic
Zionist tenets about the inevitability in such circumstances of demographic
decline, assimilation or in more extreme cases, of anti-Semitic persecution and
perhaps destruction in this conflict. It is of great interest that this is the period
when the vision of the Holocaust has become continuously more central in the col-
lective memory of contemporary Jewry.
Last, but certainly not least, is the establishment of the State of Israel, offering
the possibility of full autonomous articulation of Jewish political life. This has
become the lodestone of the political dimension of Jewish identity in all Jewish
communities, linking them with one another and with the State of Israel, and ral-
lying them around the cause of Soviet Jewry.
VI
Within this entire panorama of Jewish communities a new crucial element
emerges, namely the State of Israel which has in many ways changed the entire
nature of Jewish existence.
Israel has obviously become the major symbol and focus of Jewish identity, of
its primordial and political-communal sentiment, its hope and dreams, with pride
in its achievements and criticism of its failing. On the other hand, it has not
become – as foreseen in classical Zionist ideology – the sole centre of Jewish cre-
ativity and cultural renaissance. The cultural renaissance that developed in Israel
was but one of many, albeit the most central one.
At the same time the distinct mode of crystallization of Jewish collective life
in Israel played a very special role in the crystallization of new patterns of Jewish
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collective activity and identity, not only in Israel but also beyond it. First of all, it
was instrumental in the revival of the political dimension of Jewish existence and
the orientation to the state of Israel, which could be found in almost all Jewish
communities and their sectors and constituted a central pivot of this dimension.
Thus, for instance, in a country like France, with its relatively long tradition of
assimilation and of the emphasis of Jewish identity as a religious community, this
attitude has found its expression in such events as Raymond Aron’s polemic
against de Gaulle during the Six-Day War, the chief rabbi’s sermon during the
Yom Kippur War, and later on in the 1970s the growing political engagement of
large parts of the Jewish community in connection with French policies toward
Israel, an engagement intensified by the influence in the French community of
younger generations, as well as of North African Jews, who became very active in
Jewish activities and organizations.
The articulation of this political dimension in relation to the state of Israel was
no less far-reaching in other Jewish communities. The English community has a
much longer tradition of such activity, especially through the Board of Deputies
and the fact that for many years London was the headquarters of the World Zion-
ist Organization. Such activity was particularly visible in the United States, in the
activities of such bodies as the Board of Presidents of the major Jewish organiza-
tions; the United Jewish Appeal ; the various Jewish political lobbies, and the like,
and latterly in the intensified worldwide activities of the World Jewish Congress.
Activities related to Soviet Jewry became a major focus of such activities, in addi-
tion to those related to the state of Israel.
Significantly enough, the old controversies around Zionism, around the via-
bility of the Zionist vision, which abounded within the Jewish communities in
Europe and also in the United States, from the very beginning of Zionist and Jew-
ish settlement in Eretz Israel, have almost entirely abated. The tragic experience
of the Holocaust, the fact that Palestine, and later Israel, was initially at least the
only place which readily accepted the Jewish refugees from Europe and Asia, the
very fact of the successful establishment of the state of Israel, have made most of
these controversies meaningless. When some groups, as for instance the Ameri-
can Council for Judaism in the United States, attempted, in the late 1940s or early
1950s, to continue in this vein, they found but little resonance within the Jewish
communities. In so far as controversies developed, as they did especially from the
early 1970s, they became focused on questions pertaining to the degree to which
Israel did indeed live up to the various ideals which were expected from it ; on the
degree of support to be given to it and lately around the right of Jews to dissent
publicly from the policies of the Israeli government.
In many Jewish communities, especially in the United States in the 1950s and
1960s, Israel constituted a central, in the beginning a very new and potent, com-
ponent of their Jewish «civil religion». Activities on behalf or in connection with
the state of Israel often opened up for large parts of Jewish leadership channels of
participation in the political activities of their own countries, even if with the pass-
ing of time many of these leaders began to take these activities and those con-
nected with Israel for granted. Yet these activities continued to be symbols of Jew-
ish solidarity and attachment. But this very centrality, not unlike that of Eretz
Israel in the period of the Second Temple and later on the period of the great mish-
naic and Talmudic centers, greatly weakened its potentially revolutionary impact
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on these communities. Israel no longer was seen according to a pristine Zionist
vision, as the only place in which it is possible to reconstruct their life as modern
Jews. Nor was it seen, as presumed in classical Zionist ideology, as the sole cen-
ter of Jewish creativity, the only place in which new types of social, educational,
and cultural activities and creativity of the Jewish people could develop. The cre-
ative impulse of many Jewish communities did not necessarily focus on life in
Israel, and the pattern of Jewish renaissance developed in Israel was but one pat-
tern of such creativity, even if a central one, at least until the early 1980s.
The central place of Israel in the constitution of the boundaries of Jewish col-
lective identity came very forcefully to the fore after the 1988 election in Israel
when several religious parties were making strong demands, as a condition for
joining the coalition, to shape the «Who is a Jew» clause in the Law of Return (the
law that opens Israel to every Jew) in a strictly halakhic direction. Such a change
would delegitimize conversions and marriages performed by Conservative and
Reform rabbis. It was natural that this proposal would arouse the ire of large parts
of American Jewish organizations, who put great pressure on the prime-minister
elect, Yitzhak Shamir, not to accede to this demand. This was the only time that
the official American Jewish organizations directly interceded in Israeli politics,
claiming that in this case not only Israeli problems were at stake.
The state of Israel also provided a geographic center, a symbol of common her-
itage and common solidarity for large parts of the Jewish people indeed the only
or major pivot common to all or most of the Jewish people. It also provided a cen-
tral – not always easy, simple, indeed often a very ambivalent – focus of collective
Jewish identity.
Many Jews search in Israel for the manifestation of those dimensions of Jew-
ish existence and themes of Jewish civilization with which they strongly identify,
not only those of political and military strength and collective identity, but also
those of social justice, full religious fulfillment, or for some great civilizationary
vision, as well as those of « simple» communal-familial Jewish solidarity. The
demands made on Israel from such points of view were often utopian, exagger-
ated, unrealistic – very diverse and often contradictory – but all of them attested to
the fact that the state of Israel constituted a continuous, central focus of such ori-
entations. Even the ambivalence of criticism against Israel that became more and
more vocal from the mid-1970s attested to the relatively central place of Israel in
the construction of contemporary collective Jewish identity.
VII
Yet, although Israel continues to be a central component in Jewish identity, the
nature and strength of this component seems to have been continuously changing
in line with the differences in their respective historical experiences and collective
agendas, and ambivalence to Israel seems to have been increasing.The centrality
of the state of Israel in the contemporary Jewish experience did not mean that the
concrete relations between the Jewish communities in the Diaspora and the state
of Israel always have been harmonious or stable. It indeed is a part of the relative
fluidity of this experience that such relations also have been changing continu-
ously and these relations began to change in the 1950s and 1960s, when the very
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establishment of the state of Israel became a source of pride to the Diaspora com-
munities and probably greatly helped the integration of these communities in their
respective countries to a great anxiety about the security of the state at the out-
break of the Six-Day War and great pride in its victory. These relations have been
changing since then, giving rise to many potential and actual points of tension,
and conflicts, which became intensified from about mid-1970, and especially
since the mid-1980s. The criticism of Israel and of the policies of Israeli govern-
ments have been increasing lately, highlighting a very basic dilemma in the rela-
tions between Israel and the Jewish communities in the Diaspora - a dilemma or
problem rooted in their basically different historical experiences, especially in the
difference between a Jewish community that constitutes not only a majority in its
own land but also is responsible for running a state and the Jewish communities in
the Diaspora, which constitute minorities, even if seemingly fully participating
minorities in their respective countries. In the first three or four decades after the
establishment of the state of Israel, when the internal assurance of Jewish com-
munities in the Diaspora was greatly strengthened by the very existence of Israel,
this difference in the basic historical conditions of existence, in their basic respec-
tive historical experiences, and hence in their respective agendas, was glossed
over. Since the late 1970s the picture changed, highlighting more and more some
awareness of these differences and their consequences for the relation between the
Jewish communities of the Diaspora and Israel. Thus, in the early 1970s Simone
Veil, then French Minister of Educaiton, pointed out to some of these in her
speech of acceptance of an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University.
«Today Judaism’s values are integrated in a state ; they are integrated in a soci-
ety, a society which has not existed for more than 2,000 years. And we, of the
Diaspora, hope that Israel will remain the defender of these values, of this Human-
ism. We must clear say that this is certainly more difficult situated in the position
of a state, no longer in that obligatory minoritarian position, to continue to carry a
flame like this.And I hope as a French woman, but as a French Jewish woman, and
a Jewish French woman, that our countries will help each other to continue carry-
ing this flame and that they will ceaselessly defend these values, whatever hap-
pens. And I know that for every state this is sometimes difficult, that for every
state there is a need to mobilize, that states find themselves confronted with situ-
ations which could be « raison d’Etat »; but that precisely we have always been
proud in a certain way of being above that, of having something more, which has
been possibly forced, and today, what I hope is that the miracle of Israel, the mir-
acle of Jerusalem will reproduce itself, and I am sure that this challenge (I am sure
of it and do not just hope it) will be your victory and ours». It was not often easy
for many Jews in the Diaspora to accept the fact that Israel has become a « nor-
mal» state or at least that in many circumstances it had to behave like any normal
state in defense of its interests, and not according to some utopian criteria. With all
their seeming self-assurance with respect to their standing in the countries of their
residence, many, although certainly not all, Jews in the Diaspora tended to follow
the tendencies of large sectors of the media to judge Israel by different higher
moral standards than other nations. Such tendencies often became intensified in
the 1980, with the Lebanon War, and with the Arab uprising in the West bank. The
fact that the double standard used by many media in reporting the different sides
or aspects of these events and disputes often fed on latent anti-Semitic tendencies
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and focused them on Israel often gave rise to ambivalent reactions on part of the
Jews themselves. Some would react strongly against the application of such dou-
ble standards; others, possibly out of some feeling of insecurity in their own iden-
tity or standing in their countries, seemingly would accept such applications.
Some of the pronouncements of Jewish leaders in the Diaspora seemed to indicate
the Israel should not engage in activities which could embarrass them; which
could go counter to the way in which they wanted to portray themselves in their
societies. Controversies around Israel shifted from the older views about the via-
bility of the Zionist vision to those about Israel, but not necessarily other Jewish
communities in its life and policies, living up to the tenets of this vision. Indeed
against the background of this paradoxical change of the place of Israel in the life
of Jewish communities various trends also developed of denial of its centrality in
Jewish life and ambivalence to it. In a more extreme way this new attitude found
expression in public declarations, made by many Jewish leaders, of a strong
emphasis on the equality of the Diaspora and Israel in Jewish life and in criticism
of Israel for its seeming failure to live up to those ideals or themes perceived by
the Jewish communities in the Diaspora as constitutive of their viability as minori-
ties in free societies or for the loss of Jewish creativity in Israel. Thus since the
early 1980s, if not earlier, one could hear quite often the accusation or claim that
many patterns of creativity, in which Jews in the Diaspora excel – be it high acad-
emic achievement, manifest in the winning of Nobel Prizes, in economic entre-
preneurship, and the like – find no counterpart in Israel, above all in that Israel
which underwent all the processes of change attendant on the disintegration of the
initial mold of Israeli society. True enough those making these claims seem to for-
get or to be unaware of the fact that all these successes of the Jews in the – above
all free – Diasporas have been contingent on the Jews being a minority. Members
of this minority were able to find their ways into, lately quite central, arenas or
niches without having to take care, as a collectivity, of the basic infrastructure of
their respective societies. In Israel, of course, the construction of this infrastruc-
ture has made major claims on the creative impulses of the leading sectors of
Israeli society. It is only a few of the Jewish leaders in the Diaspora, for instance,
Stuart Eizenstadt (in a speech before the American Jewish Israeli Relations Insti-
tute in Jerusalem) who would admit that however good and even secure the posi-
tion of the Jewish communities in the Diaspora is, they do not and cannot (in con-
trast to the situation in Israel) control their own collective destiny. But the very
fact that such criticism is voiced continuously signals a marked change in the
Israel-Diaspora relations, the development of different collective agendas in Israel
and in the Jewish communities in the Diaspora.
VIII
Another crucial component in changing the experiences of contemporary Jew-
ish communities have been the changing intercivilizational frameworks, relations
and encounters, especially the relations and encounters between the countries and
communities which develop within the frameworks of the monotheistic civiliza-
tions. These encounters indeed have changed greatly since medieval times and the
beginnings of incorporation of Jews into the modern civilizations from the late
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eighteenth century up to the Second World War. The major change lies in the
seeming abatement of the older hostile relations between the Jewish civilization
and people and their host civilizations and societies, with the development of so-
called postmodern tendencies, and decline of the nation-state, and the growing
tolerance in Western societies of cultural and social heterogeneity, and with the
widespread, at least official delegitimation of anti-Semitism after the Holocaust.
This growing tolerance can be found not only in the wider acceptance of Jews as
citizens of full standing but also in many attempts at interfaith-meetings between
different Christian churches and organizations and Jewish groups. But there is
another side to these developments. Such occurrences as the dispute about the
convent in Auschwitz ; the renegation of the Archbishop of Krakow on the agree-
ment with Jewish representatives to remove it, and the sharp words with strong
anti-Semitic overtones of the Cardinal Primate of Poland with respect to this
debate indicate that such growing tolerance may be only skin deep. The changing
basis of political identity in the open societies has not eliminated anti-Semitism
and Jewish-Gentile tensions, even if their form has greatly changed. The resur-
gence of strong, « traditional» anti-Semitism in Russia and many Eastern Euro-
pean countries after the downfall or reform of the communist regimes within
them; by the growth of many manifestations of anti-Semitism in Western coun-
tries in the late 1980s, as well as by the very strong propensity of many sectors of
European societies, as well as of the more official organs of the European com-
munity to react very strongly to Israel’s stance with respect to the Palestinian
problem, a reaction far beyond that to similar activities by other states or commu-
nities – all these attest to the continuity of anti-Semitic tendencies – even if often
in highly transformed ways. In this respect the relations between Jews and Gen-
tiles – both within their respective societies and in the international arena – and the
possibility of different forms of Jewish self-expression in these frameworks, con-
tinued to be a very important test of the inner strength of Western societies. The
opponents of the pluralistic, open aspect of Western heritage objected to any
expression of Jewish collective identity, and consequently to the State of Israel
and Zionism. The centrality of Israel in the Jewish contemporary experience
caused these tensions to be transposed to the international sphere. The hostile rela-
tions between Israel and most of its neighboring states are seemingly of a differ-
ent, new nature: mostly conflicts between national states and movements. But it
has become evident that these relations, as well as the multiple reactions to the
Israeli-Arab conflict throughout the Western and Muslim world, bear many of the
seeds of the historical ambivalent, hostile relations between the Jewish people,
their civilization, and their host civilizations. Lately these relations have become
closely interwoven with the upsurge of a rather new type often very virulent anti-
Semitism both in the West, as well as in Arab countries – an anti-Semitism often
promulgated by intellectual « leftist » groups and opinion leaders – connected with
more popular outbursts1. The combination of all these developments, evident in
the upsurge of anti-Israeli outbursts during the UN Conference in Durban and of
the new anti-Semitism in Europe, and in the strong anti-Israeli stance of many –
1 See P. Ignascu and B. Kosmin (eds.), A New Antisemitism?, Profile Books, London, 2003.
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especially leftist European intellectuals and movements and the more violent
Arab antisemitism – may cast some doubt whether indeed the older hostile com-
ponents in the relations between Jews and the civilizations and societies to which
they interact, have entirely disappeared, only forty years after the Holocaust.
Indeed all these strongly attest to the strengthening and reconstitution of these
«older» civilizational themes. The Jews may be also caught in « the war of civi-
lizations» which seemed to burgeon in Europe after September 11, 2002. At the
same time the relatively strong reactions of many official or « semi»-official bod-
ies in the European Union, the UN, against anti-Semitic tendencies, as well as the
central place give in many countries to the memory of the Holocaust attest to
important changes in these inter-civilizational relations – without obliterating
many of the older components. The transformation of Jewish collectivities in the
framework of modern and postmodern civilization, each with different chances
for survival and seemingly with a growing chance for assimilation through drift-
ing away. It is still too difficult to estimate the chances of such development, the
realization of such possibilities. On the one hand, the differences in the historical
experiences of different Jewish communities may increase the dissociation among
them and the possibility of actualizing each of these tendencies. On the other
hand, it seems that the chances of realizing such possibilities are mitigated, but not
necessarily made impossible, both by the continuous interrelations among the var-
ious Jewish communities, and by their continuous and variegated encounters with
the broader environment, whether with their «host» societies or with the Muslim
world and Arab states in the Middle East. There is no easy solution to these prob-
lems – they remain an essential feature of the contemporary Jewish situation but
also, paradoxically, one of the foci of its solidarity and a potential reservoir of
strength. These potentialities will be maximalized not by trying to find formulae
and prescriptions acceptable to all Jewish communities, but rather by opening up
channels of communication between them, beyond the routine political and orga-
nizational ones, channels of continuous advice, dialogue and mutual exploration
of the common past, present and future. The combination of all these develop-
ments, within the various Jewish communities and in their relations with other
societies, will provide the answer or answers about the fate of Jewish civilization
in the modern era, and will tell which of the various tendencies pointed out here,
or their combinations, will become predominant. Only the future can tell.
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